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Anti-Haitianism, Historical Memory, and
the Potential for Genocidal Violence in
the Dominican Republic
Edward Paulino
History Department, CUNY/John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Following the 2005 murder of a Dominican woman near the border between the
Dominican Republic and Haiti, Haitian communities were deported en masse and
their homes violently ransacked by Dominican civilians seeking revenge. These
violent expulsions were not only human-rights violations but part of a historic
pattern of anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic that originated in the
nineteenth century. This article calls attention to the possibility of genocidal
violence in the Dominican Republic by examining the violent 2005 attacks on the
Haitian community there. It suggests that an anti-Haitian legacy that includes the
1937 Haitian Massacre and the contemporary and systematic denial of Dominican
citizenship to Dominicans of Haitian descent are important but understudied
indicators that raise the potential for an escalation of mass violence against the
largest ethnic and racial minority in the Dominican Republic.

Between May and September 2005, nearly 3,000 Haitians living in the Dominican
Republic were deported to Haiti.1 These massive deportations came on the heels of the
murder of a Dominican woman near the Dominican–Haitian border. The murder
sparked a series of pogrom-like attacks against Haitian communities throughout the
Dominican Republic. Men, women, and children were forcibly removed from their
homes by the Dominican military, many of them stripped of their identity papers, and
herded onto trucks and school buses. In several towns, Dominican civilians looted the
abandoned wooden shacks that Haitians called home, taking anything of value.
Unwanted items were removed from the houses and burned.2 The deportees were
taken to various towns along the border by the Dominican military. Upon arrival, they
waited for hours under the unforgiving Caribbean sun, without food or water.
Eventually, the military ordered the Haitian passengers to exit the buses and walk
across the border into Haiti—a nation many had never visited.
Many of the ‘‘Haitian’’ deportees were not immigrants. They were born and raised
in the Dominican Republic: bicultural and bilingual persons, Dominican-Haitians,
whose parents were long-time residents on Dominican soil. Although Haitians have
been living in the Dominican Republic for more than a century, and constitute the
nation’s largest ethnic minority, they are excluded from the right to Dominican
citizenship.3
At birth, Dominicans of Haitian descent are systematically denied birth
certificates—the prerequisite for obtaining la cedula, the national ID card. Without
this card, which contains biographical information such as blood type, skin complexion,
height, and weight, a person is unable to obtain important government documents such
as passports or drivers’ licenses. For the most part, Dominicans of Haitian descent also
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cannot vote or otherwise participate in the political life of the country. In short, they are
unable to integrate into the Dominican body politic.
At the same time, ethnic Haitians in the Dominican Republic represent an
indispensable source of labor to be exploited. In the agricultural, home-construction,
and private-security sectors, Haitian labor is ubiquitous and an essential part of the
Dominican economy. The Haitian presence is evident in any major Dominican city
or small town, and this demographic reality is not new. Their presence is a result
of a long history of intra-island movement and collaboration, specifically along
the 300-mile border that separates the two republics. For example, twice a week,
Dominican border towns host market days, during which Haitians can enter freely to
trade with Dominican merchants. This is a remarkable example of mutual cooperation
and a vibrant local economic enterprise that dates back to the eighteenth century.
Notwithstanding this collaborative history, there is also a genocidal history that
precedes the most recent attacks on the Haitian community and points to an ominous
future. The year 1937 saw the most violent attack on Haitians in Dominican history.
The Dominican military conducted a genocidal campaign to remove all Haitians from
the Dominican Republic; thousands of Haitians were killed or fled into neighboring
Haiti, becoming political refugees. Ordered by the dictator Rafael Trujillo (1930–1961),
this event marked the modernization of anti-Haitianism: the state sponsored
institutional and ideological campaign to turn Haitians into the official enemy of the
Dominican state. Although anti-Haitianism has its historical roots in the early 1800s,
Trujillo and his intellectuals would, in unprecedented fashion, crystallize a historic but
diffuse anti-Haitian sentiment into official government discourse. Starting after the
massacre in 1937 and lasting through 1946, this nationalistic state doctrine sought to
erase the historic and collaborative history between the two peoples while promoting
xenophobic government policies along the border.4 Unfortunately, this anti-Haitian
sentiment outlived the dictatorship, remaining solidly entrenched in Dominican
society for subsequent generations.
For the last sixty years, the Dominican government has been unwilling to accept
the legacy of the 1937 massacre and its moral responsibility for this crime against
humanity. Moreover, along with the rhetoric of opportunistic politicians who
manipulate anti-Haitian rhetoric, this violent past partly explains why a systematic
government policy to scapegoat and deport Haitians has emerged and intensified
in recent times. Dominican authorities contend that, like other sovereign nations
(they often cite the US policy of deporting immigrants), the Dominican Republic has
the right to expel persons whom authorities believe to have entered the country
illegally. Yet this latest round of deportations is disturbing, both because of their
spontaneous grassroots intensity and because they were sanctioned by government
policies that reject the inclusion of Haitian ethnicity as part of a larger pluralistic
Dominican society.
The focus of this article is to expose the recent and ongoing hostility against
Haitians in the Dominican Republic and to argue that this violence merits special
attention because of its proto-genocidal nature. The recent anti-Haitian violence in the
Dominican Republic should not be seen as an isolated event, as a case in which the
majority population simply deports a racial and ethnic minority. Anti-Haitian
prejudice and discrimination, combined with anti-black racism, permeates all levels
of Dominican society. Haitians are viewed as the black ‘‘other,’’ culturally incapable of
assimilating. The situation is more ominous today because the Dominican Republic
has many features generally considered key prerequisites for the organization and
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perpetration of mass murder: the existence of a stigmatized racial/ethnic minority
group within the dominant society; the political and economic disenfranchisement
of that minority group; and the historical precedent of state-sponsored mass murder.
Taking these and other factors into account, I argue that unless preventive measures
are taken to integrate this minority group, the current state policy of violent
deportations or ethnic cleansing will mean that future and more intensified genocidal
violence against Haitians cannot be ruled out in the Dominican Republic.5

A Murder Awakens Historic Animosities
In early May 2005, several Haitians in the Dominican border town of Hatillo Palma
invaded the home of Domingo Luna and his wife, Maritza Núñez, both in their
early thirties. The assailants knew their victims; they were neighbors and on friendly
terms. Unfortunately, familiarity and goodwill ended in a violent death that would
reverberate across the nation. In the confrontation, Maritza was killed; her husband
barely survived teeth-crushing machete blows to his mouth. The assailants were
eventually captured. But what happened next is all too familiar in the realm of ethnic
violence.
Stirred by the murder, Dominican residents of Hatillo Palma retaliated by
expelling all of their town’s Haitian residents. The word spread quickly, and Haitian
residents throughout the community were told they had until 6:00 p.m. to leave town.
Fearing for their lives, Haitians abandoned their homes. As they fled, their Dominican
neighbors descended upon the abandoned wooden shacks previously rented to Haitian
workers and began looting their possessions. Unwanted items were removed from the
houses and burned. According to local residents, the murder represented the breaking
point in a series of violent Haitian attacks on Dominicans over the previous
year.6 Apparently, Maritza’s murder was the straw that broke the camel’s back.
By the time I arrived in the town on 29 May, almost three weeks after the murder
and civilian rampage, there were no Haitians left. In a town where Haitians had
constituted a significant percentage of the population and economy, the scene was
surreal. One long-time Dominican resident told me, ‘‘I will pay you money, if you see
a Haitian walking down the street. We don’t want Haitians here. We don’t want them!’’
The action was not without its costs, however. Echoing many who told me that
the expulsion of the Haitian community represented an economic blow to the town,
one resident, an employee of a betting parlor, told me the following story: ‘‘Before the
expulsion, I used to sell $1,000 RD [US$35] daily in lotto tickets. Now, I sell about $600
RD [US$21]. But I am glad they are gone. You can only take so much.’’
Fueled by relentless nationwide media reports describing the murder of
a defenseless Dominican woman by Haitians, the violent attacks spread to other
towns.
In response to the attacks on Hatillo Palma and the surrounding areas, the army
and immigration officials began rounding up Haitians throughout the Dominican
border region, under the pretense of ‘‘protecting’’ them from vigilante mobs.7 I visited
several semi-urban and rural Haitian communities from which long-time residents
had been deported. Every story was heart wrenching. Take, for example, the case
of one-year-old Mari, a Dominican-Haitian who, along with most of her community
near the northwestern border, was removed to Haiti during the initial deportations of
May 2005. With the help of organizations such as Solidaridad Fronteriza, many
deportees, including Mari, were able to return to the Dominican Republic.8 Others,
Mari’s mother among them, were not so fortunate. At the time, Solidaridad Fronteriza
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was petitioning the Dominican government to allow persons like Mari’s mother
to return to the Dominican Republic. But the scars that these deportations had
inflicted were already evident in the faces of the children. According to a Dominican
neighbor who was caring for Mari, the little girl had fallen physically ill and was
mentally distraught at the loss of her mother.
Many of Mari’s adult neighbors, who worked and raised families in the Dominican
Republic, had also been deported. Even those who had some form of legal documentation
had their identity papers taken from them or destroyed. An example is the case of Pedro.
During the deportation raids, Pedro, a Haitian father of eleven and a farmer, awoke to
the sight of Dominican soldiers, brandishing rifles, who had forced themselves into his
small wooden shack. The soldiers handcuffed him and deported his entire family.
He says that in the early-morning raids of 13 May, the army stole his entire
savings—$6,000 RD, the equivalent of about US$200 at the time.9 Like many deportees
who endured several grueling days in Haiti, Pedro’s family returned to the Dominican
Republic with the help of religious and human-rights organizations. But Pedro did not
have his identity cards, given by the immigration department, because the soldiers had
ripped them up during the initial raids. Despite having resided for many years
in Dominican territory, he was deported. He ultimately did make his way back into the
Dominican Republic to rejoin his family, but not without first injuring his leg in
the process. Others who owned businesses, such as small stores, were also deported.
Such arbitrary deportations of Haitians and their descendants have been occurring with
growing frequency since the early 1990s. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has summed up
the situation as follows:
Suspected Haitians are targeted for deportation based on the color of their skin, and are
given little opportunity to prove their legal status or their claim to citizenship. As a
rule, people facing deportation from the Dominican Republic have no chance to contact
their families, to collect their belongings, or to prepare for departure in any way. They
are frequently dropped at the Haitian border within a matter of hours after their initial
detention, sometimes with nothing more than the clothes on their back.10

The Maritza Núñez murder—the killing of a Dominican woman by Haitians—
provoked such intense anger that it inspired violent and unprecedented civilian
backlash. In the southern border region, in the town of Enriquillo, near the major
southwestern city of Barahona, Father Jesus Alvarez, a Spanish priest who works for
the Spanish Institute of Foreign Missions in defense of Dominican and Haitian rights,
reported that following the murder of Maritza, a mob of over 100 people mobilized in
the town to search for Haitians. The mob, disproportionately composed of adolescents,
carried bats and sticks and wore hoods to hide their identity. Father Alvarez himself
was threatened for denouncing the nationwide deportations of Haitians.11 The attacks
prompted the editorial staff of one Dominican daily to write,
It is the obligation of all to condemn vehemently the violence that is carried out in the
Northwest (border region) against Haitian immigrants, documented or undocumented,
because the Ku Klux Klan hood does not suit Dominicans.12

But why should Dominicans retaliate so violently against their Haitian neighbors?
Where does this Dominican fear and contempt for Haitians originate? As the next
section shows, the recent mass expulsions of Haitians represent the latest chapter in
the historical legacy of anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic. Indeed, part of the
explanation lies in how the Dominican Republic emerged as an independent nation
in the nineteenth century.
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A History of Antagonism
Historically, Dominicans have viewed Haiti, and Haitians migrating to their country,
as a profound threat. The 1791 slave revolt in Saint Domingue (present-day Haiti)
terrified slave-owning societies throughout the Americas.13 No society felt the
repercussions of this tumultuous political upheaval more than the Spanish colony of
Santo Domingo, on the eastern end of the island of Hispaniola.
By 1801, Toussaint L’Ouverture had marched into Santo Domingo in the east
and captured the city, intent on the unification of the island. About 2,000 Santo
Domingo residents fled the city, fearing the worst.14 In 1802, Napoleon sent an
expedition to restore slavery on Hispaniola. Toussaint and his army fled Santo
Domingo but would subsequently defeat the French troops, eventually declaring the
birth of the Republic of Haiti in 1804. A year after Haiti’s declaration of national
independence, Haitian forces under J.J. Dessalines marched eastward across the
island to expel the French forces that had remained in Santo Domingo after
Toussaint’s flight in 1802. The Haitian logic was clear: to oppose a potential future
European invasion and the restoration of slavery through the unprotected eastern
part of the island. Haitian forces were unable to capture the city, but in their retreat
westward, the army left a bloody trail of carnage. Haitian soldiers wreaked havoc
in the Dominican countryside, destroying several cities and massacring many of
their inhabitants.15 This event, underscored by future Dominican historians,
would mark the origins of future Dominican antipathy toward Haiti.16 But the
nineteenth-century event that would forever engrain itself in the Dominican
memory, and influenced its view of Haiti, was the unification of the island by
Haitian forces from 1822 to 1844.
What Haitians called ‘‘unification’’ was designed to protect their country from
re-enslavement. But the Spanish colonists (particularly the white and mulatto
slave owners) on the eastern end of the island saw it as an invasion. This ‘‘invasion’’
sparked a Dominican Creole–led movement for national independence, which was
attained in 1844 and is to this day celebrated every 27 February in the Dominican
Republic.17
From its inception, then, the Dominican nation (particularly as constructed
by its elites) has literally been based on the rejection of Haiti. The Dominican
Republic is the only country in the Americas to have gained its independence
from another former colony: Haiti. Between 1844 and 1856, the Dominican
Republic repelled three unsuccessful Haitian military invasions; it then
willingly returned to the colonial fold, annexing itself to Spain in 1861. It became
permanently independent in 1865, after a successful national liberation movement (1863–1865) which threw off the shackles of European colonialism once and
for all.18 Nevertheless, it was the expulsion of the Haitians in 1844 that became the
seed of Dominican nationhood. It was this event that, through manipulation by the
country’s elite, would endure in the Dominican historical memory: Haitians as
invaders.
In the modern (post-1900) era, Dominican anti-Haitianism can be traced most
importantly to the 1937 massacre of Haitians—arguably one of the most egregious
genocidal massacres in the Western hemisphere in the twentieth century.
Although estimates of civilians killed range from as low as 4,000 to as high as 35,000,
we will never know with certainty the exact number of casualties.19
The dictator Rafael Trujillo and his government bear full responsibility for the
thousands of ethnic Haitians murdered in 1937. One of the most damning archival
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documents of this era comes from US Ambassador Henry Norweb, who wrote to
Franklin Delano Roosevelt about the atrocities:
apparently with the approval of President Trujillo, a systematic campaign of
extermination was directed against all Haitian residents in an area from some thirty
kilometers south of Dajabón north to Monte Cristi. The drive was conducted with
ruthless efficiency by the National Police and Army.20

The killings were not limited to the border but occurred throughout the country, except
on US-owned sugar mills and plantations, where Haitian workers were spared.
Neither Trujillo nor subsequent administrations ever faced charges for this crime
against humanity, let alone accepted responsibility.
On 31 January 1938, a few months after the massacre, the Dominican and Haitian
governments formally and peacefully settled their differences. But Trujillo refused to
acknowledge responsibility for his government’s complicity in the killings. According
to the League of Nations treaty,
The Dominican government which for its part does not admit that the Dominican State
is in any way responsible, but will on this point abide by the findings of the
judicial inquiry, which is not yet concluded, agrees to terminate by a settlement all
dispute.21

The same agreement also ‘‘liquidates and terminates definitively by means of
a settlement all claims whatsoever on the part of the Haitian Government or
persons of Haitian nationality against the Dominican Government or against persons
of Dominican nationality.’’22 This settlement legally absolved Trujillo of any
responsibility for his complicity in mass murder and staved off potential future
lawsuits.
Sixty years after the massacre, there are neither commemoration ceremonies nor
monuments dedicated to the victims and legacy of this event.23 The massacre is mostly
seen as a manifestation of a dictatorial government. Dominicans believe that they
should not be held accountable for this brutal act. Moreover, during the recent wave of
deportations, many Dominicans, in numerous conversations, eerily and nostalgically
recalled the 1937 massacre as a valid response to the overwhelming and unwanted
Haitian presence in their country.24 The failure to apologize and publicly assume
responsibility for the massacre has left an anti-Haitian legacy whereby the political
exclusion and physical removal of Haitians from the Dominican nation is generally
justified and condoned. The legacy of the 1937 massacre and deportations, combined
with a pervasive stigmatization of the Haitian minority and recurring economic crises
in Dominican society, supply many of the ingredients that could lead to a future
outbreak of genocidal violence.

Applying a Genocide Early Warning System to the Dominican Republic
There is no clear indicator to forecast mass murder. However, Israel Charny has
proposed a Genocide Early Warning System (GEWS) that offers to ‘‘continuously
monitor information on violations of human rights and . . . to learn how to predict and
alert people to the increasing dangers of mass murders in different societies before
they occur.’’25 Applied to the Dominican Republic today, GEWS social indicators
suggest that a real potential for future anti-Haitian genocidal violence exists.
These social indicators are
(1) Orientation toward force for self-defense and solution of conflicts: turning
threats into an exercise of self-defense
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Overt violence and destructiveness
Dehumanization of a potential victim target group
Perception of victim groups as dangerous
Legitimization of victimization by leadership individuals and institutions

The situation of Haitians in the Dominican Republic today conforms with many
of these indicators. Let us examine each in turn.

(1) Orientation toward Force for Self-Defense and Resolution of Conflicts:
Turning Threats into an Exercise of Self-Defense
Current anti-Haitian policies continue to seek the reduction, if not the erasure, of
Haitians from the Dominican landscape. Haitian migrants and their Dominican-born
children are consistently stigmatized for their poverty, ethnicity, and dark skin,
in a society that perversely values whiteness and in which racist acts occur with
impunity. There is also a virulent and influential anti-Haitian discourse promoted by
certain political elites. A strong sentiment exists among many in Dominican society
that a new Haitian invasion is underway. ‘‘Self-defense’’ means reinforcing the
Dominican–Haitian border to limit the flow of Haitian immigrants.
Like the current immigration debate in the United States, in which the US–Mexico
border is seen as ground zero, the Dominican government sees its border as the
nation’s most vulnerable site to be defended. Ever since the era of the Trujillo
dictatorship, the security of the Dominican border has been the responsibility of the
army. Today, partly as a reaction to the events of 11 September 2001 and the ‘‘War on
Terror,’’ the Dominican government has created a Special Forces Commando Unit: an
elite group drawn from the country’s navy, air force, army, and national police.
This multifaceted unit will provide additional support to the army in patrolling the
border.26 Yet, despite the militarization of the region, the border, more than 300 miles
long, remains highly porous. One of the main responsibilities for the Dominican Army
along the border is to apprehend and repatriate undocumented persons, and
particularly Haitians. In one month in 2004 alone, the Dominican Army,
in conjunction with immigration authorities, apprehended and repatriated nearly
2,000 Haitians along the border.27 As we have seen, the threat of being overwhelmed
by Haiti and her people has been a common trope in Dominican security discourse
since 1844.

(2) Overt Violence and Destructiveness
Colloquial references to a ‘‘silent invasion’’ from what the late and anti-Haitian
president Joaquı́n Balaguer referred to as la isla al reve´s28 (‘‘the backward island’’)
are commonly used to describe both the consistent migratory flow from Haiti and the
long-standing and demographically significant Haitian community within the
Dominican Republic. Many Dominicans believe that the estimated one million
Haitians already living in the country represent a threat to the Dominican nation
and her people. There is no shortage of hyperbole, whether in the Dominican press or
in public discourse, warning readers of the dangers that Haitian immigrants pose to
the nation. Many Dominicans cloak their anti-Haitianism in either nationalistic
rhetoric or talk of Haiti’s economic and political malaise, arguing, as one Dominican
congressman said to me, that Haiti ‘‘lacks state institutions, [that] its society
is disintegrating and therefore [it] is not a viable country.’’29
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Many Dominicans fear that the political, economic, and environmental anarchy
that has gripped Haiti will spill over across the border in the form of more Haitian
migration. They often point as well to the catastrophic levels of deforestation that can
be seen more markedly on the Haitian side of the border, where there is almost
complete erosion, while the Dominican side is comparatively green and lush.30 They
point to this as just one more example of Haitians’ inability to govern and administer
their society.
As Ervin Staub has written, ‘‘Given a preexisting devaluation and history of
mistreatment, recent increases [in discrimination, harm and violence] represent an
immediate danger signal.’’31 In the Dominican case, as the sensationalist portrayal of
Maritza’s murder by the Dominican media intensified, the deportations provoked a
violent backlash against Haitians. Three days after Maritza’s murder, two Haitian
corpses were found in Santiago, the nation’s second-largest city. According to the
coroner, these men died of internal hemorrhage and shock caused by gunshot
wounds.32 The attacks on Haitians were not limited to the northern border, where
Maritza’s murder occurred. Throughout the border region and beyond, the attacks on
Haitians were alarming for their quantity and cruelty. In late May, the decapitated
body of a Haitian man was found in the southern border town of Pedernales. His wife,
who was five months pregnant at the time, survived the attack but sustained multiple
injuries.33
Although these attacks failed to register with most American mainstream media,
international human-rights organizations denounced the incidents, even labeling
them explicitly as ‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’34
The murderous attacks and roundups that followed the Maritza murder were not
limited to poor Haitians living and working in rural areas; Haitian university students
in the Dominican Republic were also targeted for deportation and abuse. At a large
student gathering at one of the major universities, the Universidad Tecnológico del
Cibao (UTESA), Haitian students voiced to immigration authorities their fear of being
targeted by the arbitrary deportations and xenophobia gripping the nation at the time.
According to Jean Ferdino, president of the Haitian Student Committee, ‘‘We have
come legally to this country to study. We are not responsible for the criminal acts
committed by other Haitians. We need spiritual and emotional tranquility to study.’’35
Between May and August 2005, more sporadic attacks against Haitians took place.
In mid-August, the most shocking of such assaults occurred in the capital, Santo
Domingo: four Haitian immigrants were attacked and set on fire. Three of the four
succumbed to their injuries.36 Tensions ran high between the countries as a result of
these attacks. Haiti even recalled its top diplomat (at the time, the charge´ d’affaires) to
protest the brutal killings, which, on the heels of the deportations, seemed to many
observers to signal open season on Haitians in the Dominican Republic.37
By this time, the prominent non-profit organization known as El Movimiento de
Mujeres Dominico-Haitiana (Movement of Dominican-Haitian Women, or MUDHA)
was already investigating many of the violent incidents in Haitian and DominicanHaitian communities. In September 2005 alone, nine Haitians and Dominicans
of Haitian descent were murdered, apparently as part of the wave of violent antiHaitianism.38 Two attacks reminiscent of that in Hatillo Palma took place in August
and December 2005. In one, the lifeless body of a seven-year-old Haitian girl was found
brutally raped and dismembered in the province of Valverde, near the border.
Dominican residents attacked a Haitian community, setting fire to their homes and
injuring several with machetes and clubs. In another case a ‘‘rampage followed the
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discovery of the body of thirteen-year-old Dominican Diómedes (or Dicórides) de
Jesús Caba, reportedly stabbed to death by an undocumented Haitian whose name
is given as ‘Federico Pierre.’ ’’39
In December, a similar retaliatory pogrom to that of Hatillo Palma occurred in the
central Cibao region, near the town of Moca. In response to the killing by Haitians of a
well-known and beloved Dominican moneychanger in the small town of Villa Trina, a
mob of local Dominicans descended upon a nearby Haitian hamlet. According to
sources, thirty-five houses were burned in this once-vibrant community, which served
as a labor pool for the surrounding coffee plantations.40
No clearer example of overt violence and sheer destructiveness as a warning signal
for the escalation of ethnic conflict can be found than what occurred following the
murder of Dominican Maritza Núñez. Between May and December 2005, aided by a
media campaign that repeatedly ran articles on the porous border with Haiti, Haitians
and their communities were attacked violently throughout the country by Dominicans
eager to exact revenge or settle local scores. The eight-month assault by civilians and
government authorities left dozens of Haitian men, women, and children dead,
countless displaced and their homes destroyed.

(3) Dehumanization of Potential Victim Target Group
The modern and graphic dehumanization of Haitians in the Dominican Republic
begins with the 1937 Haitian Massacre. For its speed and intensity, this was the
largest killing of black people en masse in the Americas in the twentieth century, and,
as I have shown, it established a dangerous legacy of anti-Haitianism that has
persisted to the present.41 In a seminal study on anti-Haitian prejudice conducted in
the second-largest Dominican city, Santiago, researchers found that the antiHaitianism that had existed since the inception of the Dominican nation intensified
after the genocidal massacre of 1937. This quantitative and qualitative study
concluded that anti-Haitianism consists of three types of prejudice: ethnic, class,
and racial.42 At the core of anti-Haitian prejudice is anti-black racism. Ever since
the successful Haitian Revolution in 1804, residents, and particularly elites, of
the eastern end of the island have viewed Haitians as the perennial and dangerous
‘‘black other.’’ This
racism involves prejudice and discrimination. It may be personal or institutional, felt or
unrecognized, but it is normally based on a stereotype that people of a particular
genetic background all behave in some unappealing way; they all do, they have no
choice, it is in the genes.43

The dehumanization of Haitians and their descendants takes many forms. One of
the most famous cases of blatant anti-Haitianism involved a former presidential
candidate, now deceased, named José Francisco Peña Gomez. A former mayor of Santo
Domingo, a nationalistic student who protested against the 1965 US invasion, and a
high-ranking member of the International Socialist Party, Peña Gomez was poised to
win the 1994 presidential elections against the octogenarian neo-Trujillista incumbent, Joaquı́n Balaguer. He ultimately lost to Leonel Fernandez, the current president,
whose PLD party made the crucial and historic pact with Balaguer (the ‘‘Pact of
Democracy’’) to acquire the critical votes to win the presidency. Aside from political
intrigue and voter fraud, the dark-skinned Peña Gomez was the object of a vicious
racial campaign. His political opponents labeled him as either Haitian or of Haitian
descent. They warned Dominicans that history would repeat itself if a ‘‘Haitian’’
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became president, and that this would usher in another Haitian invasion of the
eastern end of the island.44
Perhaps the most effective example of Haitian dehumanization in the Dominican
Republic, aside from the government’s policy of deportation, is the guiding principle
and ubiquitous practice of political disenfranchisement. Long-term Haitian residents
and their children are systematically denied the right to Dominican citizenship;
many are undocumented in the only country they have ever known. Of course, there is
also the additional problem of under-documentation for non-Haitian Dominicans.
According to a spokesperson for the Centro Dominicano de Asesorı́a e Investigaciones
Legales (Dominican Center for Consulting and Legal Investigations, or CEDAIL),
‘‘there are entire communities in the southern part of the country where there are as
many as 50,000 people with no birth certificates’’; ‘‘up to the present, there has been no
attempt to create a mass registration of the undocumented persons.’’45 For Haitians,
however, the situation is qualitatively different. For example, unlike non-Haitian
Dominicans and those of lighter hue, Haitian women giving birth on Dominican soil
must register their children at the Haitian consulate.46 Although pregnant Haitian
women are admitted to Dominican hospitals to give birth, the emotional and
psychological toll is very high. For example, in 2003, I accompanied my wife’s uncle
to the maternity ward at the Robert Reid Cabral Hospital in Santo Domingo. He was
the senior doctor on call. I inquired whether there were any Haitian women who had
given birth, and some nurses pointed to a woman in the ward. We approached her, and
my wife’s uncle asked the woman if she was Haitian. The tears rolling down her
cheeks, as she nursed her infant child, confirmed that she was frightened of us and
feared being deported.
In 2000, an immigration bill (Article 166) was submitted to the Dominican
Congress that would prohibit hospitals or clinics in the Dominican Republic from
admitting foreign pregnant women.47 The legislation was clearly meant to deny
Haitian women the human right to give birth. As one commentator facetiously wrote
about this illogical legislation, ‘‘You would have to place guards at the entrances of the
emergency rooms with the mission of intercepting every woman with an advanced
state of pregnancy that exhibits a Haitian ‘appearance.’ ’’48 The bill did not become law,
but Haitian immigration is still seen as exacerbating already declining conditions in
Dominican hospitals. In the maternity ward at Santiago’s Hospital Regional José
Marı́a Cabral y Baez, 45% of all women giving birth in 2004 were Haitian.49 According
to one doctor, ‘‘When all these patients arrive together, our budget is very limited, and
then it appears that we would have grave difficulties.’’50 And then there is the
contentious issue of citizenship.
According to article 11 of the Dominican constitution, Dominican citizens are all
those born in Dominican Republic, except children of diplomats or people ‘‘in transit.’’51
It is this latter category that has been used by numerous Dominican governments to
discriminate against Haitians. According to a 2002 HRW report,
People who lived in the country for years, even decades, are thus squeezed into
a category designed for brief and casual visitors. Some authorities even claim that
all Haitian migrant workers, whether in the country legally or illegally, are ‘‘in transit’’
for the purposes of citizenship rules . . . Crucially, because all Haitians are
considered ‘‘in transit,’’ their Dominican-born children are not entitled to Dominican
citizenship.52

In the 1990s, sensing a gross misinterpretation of the constitution, several NGOs
filed a suit against the Dominican government for systematically excluding the
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Dominican-Haitian community from citizenship. In October 2005, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in Costa Rica ruled unanimously that the Dominican
government had discriminated against two young Dominican girls of Haitian descent
by denying them birth certificates.53 The court ordered the Dominican government to
issue birth certificates to these girls, along with a total indemnity payment of $22,000
and an official apology.54
For many human-rights activists, the Inter-American Court ruling was
groundbreaking, because it offered a first step toward recognizing the rights
of Dominican-Haitians. Unfortunately, the ruling did not deter the Dominican
government from cementing the political exclusion of this minority population.
Just two months later, the Dominican Supreme Court ruled unanimously
that ‘‘children of undocumented [Haitian] immigrants born and raised in the
Dominican Republic are not entitled to citizenship.’’55 This ruling from the
Dominican Republic’s highest court reveals a society in which international standards
of inclusion and democracy, at least with respect to the Haitian minority, are
irrelevant.
For Haitians in the workforce, this lack of legal documentation leads to
exploitation. Haitians are exploited for their cheap labor, and this condition is
exacerbated by their inability to denounce the abuses they experience. The most
famous case is that of the sugar-cane industry, where conditions have been described
as modern-day slavery.56 Sugar-plantation authorities threaten Haitian cane cutters
with deportations and often use this mechanism to avoid paying their workers. Among
the many Haitians who migrate to the Dominican Republic, children are exposed to
abuse by unscrupulous scouts (resembling the ‘‘coyotes’’ along the US-Mexican border)
who are paid to escort undocumented persons across the border. The trafficking of
Haitian children is a thriving market in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
Apparently, it is quite easy to buy children’s services. According to one observer,
‘‘You just ask around town. People know who the scouts are. You just tell them what
kind of child you are looking for and they can bring across whatever it is that
you want.’’57
As the ‘‘coyote’’ analogy suggests, Haitian migrants are not unlike Mexicans trying
to enter the United States in search of employment. Members of both groups will risk
their lives to achieve socioeconomic progress. But in the skewed and rancorous antiHaitian discourse that prevails in the Dominican Republic, immigrant lives take a
back seat to nationalist posturing. The terms of the debate are only undermined when
tragedy strikes. Reminiscent of the tragedy in which nineteen Latin Americans were
asphyxiated in a trailer truck near Victoria, Texas, in early 2006, twenty-four Haitians
were found suffocated in the Dominican Republic.58 There is one important difference
between Mexican and Haitian immigrants, however: the former benefit from a large
and organized Mexican/Latino community (many of them citizens) in the United
States, which lobbies effectively against anti-immigrant policies, whereas the Haitian
community in the Dominican Republic enjoys no comparative organizational
advantage and is not able to exercise the political or economic power to influence
Dominican lawmakers.
The victimization of Haitians and their children is legally, economically,
and socially pervasive. From the state exclusion denying citizenship, to
deportations, to exploitative working conditions and a social prejudice that permeates
all levels of Dominican society, bigotry and discrimination are both de facto
and de jure.
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(4) Perception of Victim Group as Dangerous; (5) Legitimization of
Victimization by Leadership Individuals and Institutions
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, ethnic violence in general results
from two factors: ‘‘Tensions structured or perceived along ethnic lines, often
intensified by misinformation that spreads quickly in times of crisis; and
political leadership that promotes it or fails to halt it.’’59 There is no doubt that
in times of political and economic crises, ethnic minorities are targeted as
scapegoats. In the Dominican Republic, Haitians and their descendants are
targeted and stereotypically portrayed as foreign invaders taking away jobs
from Dominicans. Dominican leaders often stoke the embers of anti-Haitian
antagonism in the press. Consider the statements of current Dominican President
Leonel Fernandez. While on a stumping trip to Puerto Rico, trying to mobilize
support for his 2004 presidential bid, Fernandez—himself once an immigrant in
New York—openly supported general amnesty for the thousands of undocumented
Dominicans residing in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Yet he neglected to mention
the hundreds of thousands of long-term Haitian residents or the Dominicans of
Haitian descent born and raised in the Dominican Republic, who are denied
citizenship. He even warned Dominicans in Puerto Rico that, if illegal Haitian
immigration was not stopped, there would be ‘‘an ethnic war something akin to what
occurred in Kosovo.’’60
For Fernandez the politician, then, all immigrant groups are not equal. Dominican
immigrants who live abroad (e.g., in Puerto Rico), and who have access to US dollars,
should be treated fairly—especially those who are of ‘‘good character.’’ But it seems
that for Fernandez, particularly during a political campaign, there are no Haitians of
good character. He echoes the fear of many Dominicans that their country will be
overwhelmed by Haitian immigrants.61
Unfortunately, Fernandez is not alone in this scare-mongering. Dozens of
newspapers and magazine articles echo his sentiment that Haitians represent
a threat to Dominican national security. In an op-ed piece entitled ‘‘Kosovo and
Haiti,’’ a Dominican company executive writes angrily of the Dominican dependency
on Haitian labor and warns of a future when Haitians will take over the Dominican
Republic. He uses the Yugoslav model to illustrate his point:
As we can see, a simple Serbian province (Kosovo) at a determined time, and
because of a government as well as the general Serbian population’s carelessness,
discovered suddenly that the Albanians were the majority who demanded their
independence.62

In his weekly newspaper column, a well-known former Trujillo aide shares his
anecdotes as a young man meeting the dictator and hearing him talk about the
‘‘Haitian question.’’ He writes that Trujillo ‘‘showed us his hands as testimonial
evidence to tell us, ‘they are stained with blood, to save your generation from the
Haitianization of the nation.’ ’’63 Such xenophobic rhetoric is more alarming when one
considers that the 1937 massacre is very much part of the immigration discourse
deployed today in response to Haitian immigration.
A similar article echoes the warning of another Kosovo, speculating that Haitian
immigration might become a sort of fifth column in the Dominican Republic. The fear
among many Dominican nationalists (as they define themselves) who propose an end
to this immigration is that, if unchecked, these Haitian migrants will become
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permanent residents in the country and eventually, as a bloc, secede from the
Dominican Republic through the ballot box:
Let’s suppose that Haitians for example become the majority in Barahona [a southern
Dominican province near the border] and tomorrow allege, in their condition of ethnic
majority and [with] some legal claims, to demand its annexation to Haiti or to declare
some type of provincial autonomy. Would we Dominicans be in a position to give up part
of our territory or declare the autonomy of some province for these reasons? The
moment requires Dominicans to pay serious attention. The situation in Kosovo is not as
distant as it seems.64

Even more worrisome is that these articles and public comments do not issue from
extremist or marginal voices within Dominican society; the authors are very much part
of the mainstream, often high-ranking officials. For example, Joaquı́n Ricardo, a
former secretary of foreign relations, writes that ‘‘the problem is there and becomes
thornier and more complex because everyday we have more Haitians in Dominican
territory.’’65 Not only are politicians warning of being overwhelmed by Haitian
immigration, but individuals in the military have also voiced their concerns.
The former head of the Dominican Armed Forces, General José Miguel Soto
Jimenez, has argued in an article entitled ‘‘Grave Amenaza’’ (‘‘Grave Threat’’) that,
rather than illegal drugs or weapons, it is Haitian immigration that represents the
most serious threat to the security of the Dominican Republic.66
Many high-ranking officials and ordinary Dominicans support the removal of
Haitians through deportations. The former president of the Universidad Autónoma
de Santo Domingo (UASD), Roberto Santana, ticked off a litany of individuals who
support a deportation policy.67 Ironically, even international observers, such as the
former head of the United Nations in the Dominican Republic, Dr. Pablo Oberti, have
supported (indirectly) the repatriations of Haitians. Oberti urged the Dominican
authorities to conduct the repatriations with ‘‘sensitivity and comprehension.’’68
Bernardo Vega, a former Dominican ambassador to the United States and author
of several important Dominican-Haitian-themed books, also voiced his opinion during
the deportations of the 1990s:
I consider that the presence of that [Haitian] labor is not advantageous for the
Dominican Republic; with the help of organizations like the United Nations, a peaceful
and civilized repatriation of Haitians who are illegally in my country should be
promoted.69

For Vega, the presence of Haitian labor in the Dominican Republic ‘‘promotes
Dominican anti-Haitianism.’’ He offers three seemingly simple recommendations for
‘‘an efficient deportation mechanism.’’ First, Vega recommends a policy of voluntary
return to Haiti, with the assistance of community and religious groups. Second, and
subsequently, Dominican industries would be inspected to discover those employing
undocumented Haitians, and employers would be fined if found in violation
of immigration laws. Third, a policy of forced deportation would be instituted. Of all
these stages, Vega finds the last the most difficult. Aside from forcing people (often
violently) from a country that they may have resided in for years and called home, he
recognizes that the difficulty in enforcing this policy is ‘‘defining who really is [a]
Haitian who resides illegally in the country.’’70 Unfortunately, the deportation of
Dominicans of Haitian decent has already occurred and is continuing; but these
egregious human-rights violations have also drawn the attention and ire of the
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Dominican and Haitian diasporas in the United States. The violent deportations in the
Dominican Republic after May 2005 prompted a member of the New York City Council
to draw up a resolution condemning the attacks on Haitians:
At home here in the United States and in my native country of the Dominican Republic,
I am always proud to lend my voice to the causes of fair immigration policy, due process
and the protection of worker rights. It is critical that we have solidarity to support such
basic human rights, and this resolution is a vehicle for the New York City Council to do
just that.71

Dominicans living abroad and their children clearly see through the hypocrisy of
Dominican immigration policy toward Haitians. The struggle for identity and place in
the United States has politically galvanized the Dominican and Haitian communities,
which have seen their families separated by deportations.

Conclusion
This article has shown that contemporary anti-Haitian violence in the Dominican
Republic has its roots in the nineteenth-century Wars of Independence and the 1937
Haitian Massacre. What can be done to ensure that current policies of ethnic
cleansing, such as deportations and denial of citizenship to long-term Haitians and
their children in the Dominican Republic, do not intensify in the future? I believe that
the fundamental responsibility lies with the political, economic, and military decision
makers in the Dominican Republic itself. A paradigm shift is in order.
The Dominican Republic, a country where globalization is embraced by government and private industry alike, has failed to globalize the way in which it preserves
its past, particularly in relation to its historic relationship with Haiti and the 1937
massacre. Unlike other countries such as Peru, Germany, Guatemala, Cambodia, and
Rwanda, the Dominican Republic has failed to apologize as a nation for its
participation in one of the hemisphere’s most egregious twentieth-century examples
of ethnic cleansing.
Dominican immigration policy must cease to depict Haitians as the historic
enemy. Popular anti-Haitian discourse manipulated by xenophobic elites must be
challenged by the state, and more institutional bilateral projects on the model of
Fwontyè Nou – Nuestra Frontera should be established.72 Such programs could
reduce and potentially eliminate the enmity to which every generation of Dominicans
has been exposed, from the nineteenth century onward. This will be difficult, of course,
since the roots of anti-Haitianism lie at the very heart of Dominican nationalism
and patriotism: the creation of the Dominican nation involved a rejection of Haiti.
A new type of Dominican nationalism and identity must emerge in order for all
Dominicans to view Haiti as their long-term partners. A first step would be to initiate a
cathartic national discussion about the role of Dominicans in the 1937 killings, which,
despite being factually incorporated in the academic historiography, are remembered
as solely the responsibility of the dictator Trujillo.
Debates similar to those in other countries about historic participation in the
destruction of ethnic minority groups must take place in the Dominican Republic.
The most recognizable example of such negotiations over historical memory is German
society’s attempt to comprehend why their ancestors participated in the killing of
Jews and other minorities. Dominicans, too, must ask, How could our countrymen
and -women have participated, in 1937 and in more recent times, in the killing,
burning, maiming, and deportations of their Haitian and Dominican-Haitian
neighbors?73 The 1937 massacre should also be remembered by Americans,
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who especially should be made aware of this event because President Roosevelt, as is
painfully evident in the diplomatic correspondence, was aware of the killings—and
chose not to interfere.74
In the last ten years, there has been a global movement to acknowledge the
historical wrongs of national pasts. From the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in
Guatemala and South Africa to breaking the silence of forgotten massacres, such as
El Mozote in El Salvador and Trieste in Italy, the need to remember and come to terms
with one’s national past has gained momentum.75 Benedict Anderson has described
how important it is for citizens to feel and express shame for their nation’s past
mistakes and crimes. Using the case of America’s role during the Vietnam
War, Anderson writes that Americans ‘‘felt ashamed that ‘their’ country’s history
was being stained by cruelties, lies, and betrayals. So they went to work in protest,
not merely as advocates of universal human rights, but as Americans who loved the
common American project.’’ He adds that ‘‘this kind of political shame is very good and
always needed.’’76 Dominicans need to explore this collective shame, not only in
relation to Trujillo’s genocidal policy against Haitians in 1937 but also in relation to
the human-rights violations that continue today. At a minimum, this type of discourse
will go a long way toward changing the dynamic of the current policy concerning
Haitians.
The Dominican Republic, like many countries around the world, has its share of
xenophobic politicians and ultra-nationalists, who see Haitian immigration as a threat
to their cherished way of life. Such nativistic responses are echoed, for example, in
Europe, where politicians such as Austria’s Jorg Haider or France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen
have made a name for themselves advocating punitive anti-immigrant and racist
policies. On African immigration to his town, the mayor of Treviso, near Venice, has
stated that Italians ‘‘have a 2,000-year-old civilization,’’ while African immigrants to
his town ‘‘know only the civilization of the savanna and the jungle’’—comments
thoroughly reminiscent of anti-Haitian discourse in the Dominican Republic.77
Many Dominicans I interviewed shared heart-wrenching anecdotes about growing
up black and of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic. Many spoke of seeing
friends and family deported and experiencing real prejudice on an everyday basis.78
My interviewees spanned the spectrum of Dominican-Haitian life in the Dominican
Republic: lawyers, NGO workers, students, and day laborers. Without exception, they
had all experienced directly or indirectly racist behavior by Dominicans, from racial
slurs to deportations. Perhaps the statement that best captures the DominicanHaitian desire to become part of the Dominican nation is that of Sonia Pierre, the
executive director of MUDHA. Her struggle for equal rights is emblematic of
a community that seeks democratic integration into the Dominican nation but
is institutionally excluded:
We are here and for as much as we are not recognized as a group, they [the government]
sees us [as] dangerous. The fact that we are a minority, that enrages people, but, well,
we understand that we, children of Haitian immigrants, are a minority. We were
born here. We are trying to educate ourselves here; we want to participate, we want
to contribute . . . but we want to be recognized; there is a segregation here, if you
will, toward this [Haitian] population, and so we are not seen as part of the
Dominican identity, we are not seen as part of that [cultural] syncretism; it’s much
easier to accept any Dominican of any origin than a Dominican of Haitian origin.79

For many in the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s weak or absent institutions and the
country’s political turmoil represent a ‘‘grave threat.’’80 But portraying Haiti as
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a threat to Dominican society is the wrong way to conceptualize the future of both
nations. Rather than seeing Haiti as a security challenge or as a burden, Dominican
policy makers should, at every level, invest in a re-conceptualization of their
relationship with their neighbor that will address the following questions: How can
we create and implement a long-term and sustainable vision for both nations? What
are the policies that need to be implemented today in order to sustain population
increases tomorrow?
According to the US State Department, there are at least 8,833,634 people in
the Dominican Republic, and at least 7,656,166 in Haiti, for a total of 16,489,800
people on an island whose surface area is the equivalent of the American state of
Maryland plus two New Hampshires. What will the population of Hispaniola be in
2030? In 2050? How will population growth affect the island’s resources, such as
water?81 How can the Dominican Republic, which shares the same ecosystem with
Haiti, contribute to the reversal of the latter’s man-made catastrophe of deforestation?
How can both nations jointly address the staggering, and still growing, HIV epidemic,
particularly when the World Bank states that the ‘‘Dominican Republic and Haiti
together account for 85 percent of the total number of HIV/AIDS cases in the
Caribbean’’?82
Former Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was fond of saying that Haiti
and the Dominican Republic are wings of the same bird; if one wing is broken, the bird
cannot fly. He was referring to the more than 200 years of shared collaborative and
local economic and social history between Dominicans and Haitians. But the elites of
both countries have portrayed each other as geographically and racially distinctive
people. I contend that Aristide was right: the metaphorical bird of Hispaniola cannot
fly with broken wings. No matter how many more paved roads, modern tourist resorts,
and quasi-white Miss Universe contestants the Dominican Republic proclaims to
demonstrate its eternal superiority over Haiti, it too is a broken wing. An inclusive and
generous vision may, by contrast, finally allow both halves of Hispaniola to take
ethereal and triumphant flight. Let us hope.
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By mid-May 2005, Dominican newspapers reported more than 2,500 persons deported.
See ‘‘Denuncia persecución indiscriminada: Obispo Mao pide detener repatriación de
haitianos,’’ Hoy.com, 16 May 2005, www.hoy.com.do (accessed 16 May 2005). By mid-June,
600 more Haitians (in only five days) had been deported from the Dominican Republic:
‘‘Autoridades dominicanas repatrı́an 600 haitianos en cinco dı́as,’’ Hoy.com, 15 June 2005,
www.hoy.com.do (accessed 15 June 2005). There are some unconfirmed estimates that
place the number of Haitians deported by May 2005 at over 10,000.
‘‘Colchones, camas, sillas, estufas y otros enseres para el hogar fueron reducidos a cenizas
por las acciones de moradores de aquı́, quienes decı́an vengar la muerte de Maritza Núñez
y las heridas que recibió su esposo Domingo Antonio Luna, en un asalto en su vivienda y
colmado Luna la madraguda del Lunes [Mattresses, beds, chairs, stoves and other
household goods were reduced to ashes by the actions of local residents who decided to
avenge the death of Maritza Núñez and the injuries received by her husband, Domingo
Antonio Luna, in an attack on their home and store Luna early on Monday morning.].
See ‘‘Arrasan casuchas haitianas en Hatillo,’’ El Nacional, 11 May 2005, www.elnacio
nal.com.do (accessed 11 May 2005). I personally saw and photographed the looted
homes. Even three weeks after my arrival, the debris mentioned in this article was
visible lying outside the homes where, just a month before, Haitians had been living.
Of the 9,183,984 residents of the Dominican Republic (July 2006 estimate), one million
are estimated to be Haitians and their descendants. For Dominican population figures,
see the CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/dr.html
(accessed 6 October 2006); for more information on the range of Haitian population
figures in the Dominican Republic, see Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Background,’’ in ‘‘Illegal
People’’: Haitians and Dominico-Haitians in the Dominican Republic (2002), http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2002/domrep/domrep0402-02.htm (accessed 6 October 2006).
For the seminal article on the autonomous nature of the pre-1937 border and local
Dominican–Haitian collaboration, see Lauren Derby, ‘‘Haitians, Magic, and Money: Raza
and Society in the Haitian–Dominican Borderlands, 1900 to 1937,’’ Comparative Studies in
Society and History 36 (1994): 488–526.
By ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ I mean the ‘‘deliberate, systematic, and forced removal of a particular
ethnic group from a specified territory.’’ See Israel Charny, ed., Encyclopedia of Genocide,
vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1999), 215.
According to one sixty-eight-year old, one of the handful of Haitians remaining in the
outlying areas of Hatillo Palma, ‘‘They [Dominicans] arrived at night and started shooting
in the air, saying they were guards. When people [Haitians] walked outside, the men
started swinging their machetes.’’ See Peter Prengaman, ‘‘Attacks Strain Haitian–
Dominican Relations,’’ Chicago Sun-Times/Associated Press, 11 June 2005.
At the time, the running debate between human-rights and government officials centered
on the use of deportations. Human-rights officials denounced the arbitrary deportations of
entire communities following the Maritza Núñez murder; conversely, immigration and
local-government officials argued that the deportations were necessary to save Haitians
from vigilante mobs seeking revenge. The mayor of Hatillo Palma, Joselı́n Espinal,
asserted that she personally authorized the vehicles to transport Haitians from the town to
avoid a massacre: ‘‘No me arrepiento de haber socorrido a los Haitianos, ya que si no eran
auxiliados, los muertos se iban a contar por muchos [I do not regret saving the Haitians
because if not, many dead people would be counted].’’ See ‘‘Opina solo el tiempo resolverá
problema haitianos en Hatillo,’’ El Nacional, 13 May 2005, www.elnacional.com.do
(accessed 13 May 2005).
I have changed the names of the Haitians and Dominican-Haitians for their protection.
Solidaridad Fronteriza is a community border organization headed by Father Regino
Martinez. See Solidaridad Fronteriza, http://solidaridadfronteriza.blogspot.com/(accessed
6 October 2006).
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‘‘Pedro,’’ interview with the author, Batey Libertad in Valverde Mao, May 2005.
See HRW, Illegal People, para. 5.
Father Jesus Alvarez, interview with the author, Enriquillo, Dominican Republic,
1 June 2005.
‘‘Inaceptable’’ (editorial), El Nacional, 13 June 2005, 10 (my translation).
For the timeless and classic history of the Haitian Revolution, see C.L.R. James, The Black
Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, 2nd ed. (New York:
Vintage, 1963).
Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (New York: Hispaniola
Books, 1995), 106.
Ibid., 112.
According to Pedro San Miguel’s insightful book on Dominican intellectual history,
‘‘the separation from Haiti was a reactionary movement in defense of Spanish culture,
which had been threatened by the measures imposed by the [Haitian] occupiers . . . The
struggle against Haiti was the crucible in which the Dominican nation was formed.’’
Pedro San Miguel, The Imagined Island: History, Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 56.
Indeed, the first Dominican national anthem of 1844 began with the words ‘‘To arms,
Spaniards!’’ and contained no reference to Dominicans. But in this anthem, the seeds of
anti-Haitianism are evident: ‘‘¡No hay piedad! El haitiano insolente,/ penetrando hasta
nuestros hogares,/ profanó nuestros templos y altares . . . [There is no mercy! The arrogant
Haitian, penetrating even our own homes, disrespecting our temples and altars . . .].’’
See Félix Maria Del Monte, ‘‘Canción Dominicana,’’ http://www.jmarcano.com/mipais/
cultura/poesia/himno1.html (accessed 6 October 2006).
See Pons, The Dominican Republic, 210–18.
The most comprehensive document-based source that examines the question of
the massacre and the casualty rate is Bernardo Vega’s two-volume Trujillo y Haiti.
In Volume 1, Vega concurs with both Haitian diplomat Jean Price-Mars and Haitian
President Elie Lescot that 12,136 people were killed and 2,419 injured during the massacre
(vol. 1, 386). Interestingly, a few years later, after reviewing vague US diplomatic sources,
Vega would revise and subsequently decrease his casualty numbers, stating that only 4,000
to 6,000 people had been killed during the massacre (vol. 2, 347). Bernardo Vega, Trujillo y
Haiti, vol. 1: 1930–1937 (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1988); vol. 2,
1937–1938 (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1995).
PSF Box 70 State: 1937 FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY, 2. Norweb writes that ‘‘on three
successive nights groups of Haitian men, women and children were herded to the end of the
customs wharf at Monte Cristi and there dispatched by the soldiers. They were clubbed
over the head and thrown into the sea where the sharks completed the task by destroying
the evidence’’ (3).
‘‘Dominican Republic and Haiti, Agreement regarding Frontier Questions and
the Settlement of all Disputes resulting from the Events which have occurred during the
Last Months of the Year 1937 near the Frontier between the Two Countries,’’ 31 January
1938, League of Nations Treaty Series 187, pts. 4328–49, 176 [Haiti–DR Treaty]. Four years
later the Dominican government continued to deny responsibility for the massacre, stating
that it was ‘‘caused by bands of Haitian marauders that have always roamed around the
border regions, raiding Dominican territory and depriving native farmers of the fruits
of their toil.’’ See Consulate of the Dominican Republic, ‘‘Bulletin of Information on
Dominican–Haitian Border Incidents’’ (New York, 1941), 2.
Haiti–DR Treaty, ibid.
The lack of sites dedicated not only to the memory of events surrounding the 1937
massacre but to Dominican and Haitian collaboration is tragic. A nation like the
Dominican Republic, which embraces globalization and democracy, is still slow to preserve
this neglected past. With a little help, however, the Dominican Republic could engage its
past more forcefully. For example, the International Coalition of Historic Site Museums
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of Conscience ‘‘is a network of historic sites remembering struggles for democracy from
centuries ago to the recent past . . .. Whether it interprets great good or great evil, whether
it preserves a cultural or an environmental resource, a historic site has unique power
to inspire social consciousness and action. By opening up new conversations about
contemporary issues in historical perspective, historic sites can become new town halls,
central to civic life and democracy.’’ See the International Coalition of Historic Site
Museums of Conscience, ‘‘About the Coalition,’’ http://www.sitesofconscience.org/eng/
about.htm (accessed 6 October 2006).
Many times, during these deportations, Dominicans I spoke with—from farm workers and
maids to taxi drivers, students, and teachers—mentioned the 1937 massacre in arguing
how unchecked immigration could lead to a viable repetition of these violent policies.
Charny, Encyclopedia of Genocide, vol. 1, 255.
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